3 Comprehensive studies have detailed the assimilation experience of different immigrant groups sorted by ethnicity and generation (Neidert and Farley (1985) ), and by arrival years (Massey (1981) ).
-2-In sociology, the degree of assimilation of an immigrant is measured in four dimensionssocioeconomic inequality, segregation in housing and schools, intermarriage, and prejudice.
3 Hirschman
(1983) provides a comprehensive literature review. He covers the entire spectrum from the origins of the sociological assimilation theory (initiated by Robert Park and the "Chicago School" in 1921) to the "revival of ethnicity" school (an influential proponent being Greeley (1974) ).
In economics, the focus has been on how immigrants affect and are themselves affected by the economic well-being of the natives. Most studies have measured economic well-being by labor wages, and have measured the speed of assimilation by the rate of convergence of labor wages. These studies have
controlled for the quality of immigrants, usually measuring quality by the level of education. Useful surveys are provided by LaLonde and Topel (1991) , Borjas (1994) and Schultz (1998) .
The purpose of this paper is to shed light on this old debate using finance data. Specifically, we ask whether, when it comes to directly investing or indirectly investing in a particular foreign country, immigrants in the United States consider only the "fundamentals" of the country under consideration -the melting pot hypothesis -or, besides the "fundamentals," they also care whether this particular foreign country is their country of origin -the salad bowl hypothesis. If national origin affects direct investments abroad, it should affect indirect investments abroad in the same direction as well.
Our paper is part of a growing empirical literature that has started documenting that familiarity 4 Feldstein and Horioka (1980) documented a high positive correlation between a country's savings and its investment rate, which implies that capital flows to domestic investment opportunities, which may not necessarily be the most profitable nor the best hedge against risk. French and Poterba (1991) documented that domestic investors hold a disproportionate amount of domestic stocks in their equity portfolio. Lewis (1999) , in a lucid survey of the vast "home bias" literature that developed from these seminal papers, distinguishes between the "consumption home bias" (domestic consumption is more correlated with domestic output than is warranted in a model with optimal risk sharing) and the "equity home bias" (domestic investors hold more domestic equity than is warranted in a model with optimal risk sharing). She, as well as many others (see, for example, Pastor (2000) , Karolyi and Stulz (2001) , Glassman and Riddick (2001) ), are skeptical about the usual reasons given to explain home bias: explicit barriers to entry (such as ownership restrictions, transaction costs and taxes) or implicit barriers to entry (such as informational advantages or correlation with human capital.)
5 Petersen and Rajan (2000) study the effect of distance on lending relationships. Calem and Nakamura (1998) develop and test a spatial model for bank branching. Tesar and Werner (1995) show that U.S. investors favor Canadian stocks. Coval and Moskowitz (1999) document that U.S. investment managers hold a disproportionate amount of stocks of firms that have local headquarters. This does not seem a foolish strategy because they earn substantial abnormal returns in these nearby investments (Coval and Moskowitz (2001) .) Huberman (2001) documents that shareholders of a Regional Bell Operating Company tend to live in the area which it serves. The economic importance of geography extends to other areas besides investments. See Krugman (1991) for the seminal paper, and Neary (2001) for a comprehensive review of the new economic geography literature.
6 Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) show that Finnish investors are more likely to hold, buy, and sell the stocks of Finnish firms that not only are located close to the investor, but also communicate in the same language as the investor. Hau (2001) shows that non-German-speaking traders significantly underperform German-speaking traders when trading the 11 largest blue-chip German stocks. 7 For example, see Tootell (1995) , for an answer to the question whether racial discrimination occurs in mortgage lending in Boston. 8 The prohibition of usury has led to the development of Islamic banking. See Alkhalifa (1999) for a comprehensive overview. Previous stigma against usury may have led to less protection of creditor rights in Catholic countries (Stulz and Williamson (2001) .) 9 Berger, Klapper and Udell (2001) document that foreign-owned banks have difficulty in extending relationship loans to opaque small domestic firms. Berger, DeYoung, Genay and Udell (2000) show that, except for U.S. banks, domestic banks make more profit margins than foreign banks in five OECD local markets. Choe, Kho and Stulz (2001) document that domestic Korean individual investors have better information than foreign investors, as do Bhattacharya, et al (2000) for the case of Mexico.
-3-affects investments. One measure of familiarity is the country of residence. 4 A second measure of familiarity is geographical proximity. Physical distance seems to matter in the choice of investments. 5 A third measure of familiarity is language. This is found to be an important consideration in the decision to invest in some studies. 6 A fourth measure of familiarity is race. The controversial practice of redlining has been a focus of many papers. 7 A fifth measure of familiarity is religion. 8 A sixth measure of familiarity is national origin. 9 As the research question in this paper is not the examination of the immigrant's choice between domestic investments and foreign investments, but an examination of the immigrant's choice between various foreign investments, we focus on the sixth measure of familiarity (national origin), we ignore the first 10 Age and gender are two familiarity variables that we do not examine. We do not have data on age. Barber and Odean (2001) have documented that sex matters in the investment choice; however, in the countries we examine, the sexes are finely balanced.
-4-measure of familiarity (country of residence), and we control for the second (distance), third (language), fourth (race) and fifth (religion) measures of familiarity.
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An attractive feature of the familiarity variables is that they are structural, and so do not suffer from the endogeneity problems that plague many empirical studies. For example, though it is plausible that race affects investments, it is implausible that investments affect race. Endogeneity problems, however, cannot be eliminated in our choice of independent control variables that proxy for the "fundamental" determinants of investments. To minimize these endogeneity problems, we attempt, as much as we can, to choose independent control variables that are structural.
The independent control variables that we select for "fundamentals" that determine U.S. direct investments in a particular country are measures of: economic development, the size of the government, tax burden, integration with the rest of the world, infrastructure, capital market development, exchange rate risk, and legal environment. The independent control variables that we select for "fundamentals" that determine U.S. stock holdings in a particular country are measures of: predicted equity holdings assuming that the international capital asset pricing model holds, stock market development, risk-return tradeoffs, integration with the rest of the world, legal environment, and transparency.
Details of all independent and dependent variables -precise definitions of the variables, why we chose those variables, and the public sources from where we obtained these variables -are given in the next section and in the Appendix.
A concern in our econometric tests is that our sample size, which is the cross-section of countries 11 Major principal components are principal components whose eigenvalues are greater than 1.
-5-for which we have data, is of the same order of magnitude as the number of dependent variables in our regressions. A simple OLS regression will have embarrassingly few degrees of freedom. We address this concern by employing the following two-step method. In the first step, we reduce the number of control variables that proxy for "fundamentals" by extracting the major principal components from all the control variables. 11 In the second and final step, we run a multi-variate regression which has investment as the dependent variable, and the extracted major principal components from the control variables and each familiarity variable in turn as independent variables. This is what we find. In all the three years we investigate, 1990, 1997 and 2000, if we hold our proxies for the "fundamentals" constant, the higher the income level of an immigrant group from a particular country living in the United States, the more is the level of U.S. direct investments in that country.
Interestingly, when we sub-divide the immigrant group into a native-born cohort and a foreign-born cohort, we find that this relationship is being driven by the native-born cohort. None of the other familiarity variables matter. A panel regression controlling for fixed effects gives us the same results, providing powerful evidence of the existence of a national origin bias.
What about indirect investments? In 1997, the only year for which we have data, if we hold our proxies for the "fundamentals" constant, the higher the income level of an immigrant group from a particular country living in the United States, the more is the level of U.S. stockholdings in that country. Interestingly, as in the direct investments case, this relationship is being driven by the native-born cohort. None of the other familiarity variables matter. As a robustness check, we redo the tests using 1997 foreign stock holdings data from another source. Our results are identical.
12 Table I in Borensztein and Gelos (2001) suggests that single-country funds, where the choice of country is made by the individual investor, constitute only about 10% of emerging market equity funds in 1999.
-6-
The two independent set of tests, one on direct U.S. investments and the other on indirect U.S.
investments, lead to the same conclusion: U.S. investments in a foreign country are positively affected by the income of the immigrant group from that country living in the United States.
The interpretation of this result depends on who decides which foreign country to invest in, an individual investor or an institutional investor. If an individual makes the decision as to the choice of the foreign country, our result implies that she is partial to her country of origin, especially if her ancestors came from that country. In this case, the motive is behavioral and not informational. Why? Because if the motive is informational, we should see the effect coming from the foreign-born, who know more about the country they have just left, and not from the native-born, whose ancestors left the country long ago. We observe the reverse. If an institution makes the decision as to the choice of the foreign country, the institution is partial to the country where many rich immigrants have come from, especially if these immigrants have been in the United States for a long time. In this case, the motive is informational. Why? Because the institutional investor should be more familiar with a country whose immigrants have lived in the United States for a long time and have economically prospered.
There is reason to believe that institutional investors rather than individual investors decide on which foreign country to invest.
12
This implies, given the argument above, that familiarity breeds investment probably because familiarity is linked to better information. However, whatever may be the reason, we can conclude unequivocally that familiarity, as measured by national origin, is linked to foreign investment. It appears that the United States is a salad bowl and not a melting pot when it comes to foreign investments. 13 We choose 1990 and 2000 because of better census data in these years. 1997 is chosen because it is the only year we have data on U.S.
indirect investments, and we wanted to have a year in which we had data on both direct as well as indirect investments.
14 There was a pilot survey in 1994 as well. We, however, could not use this year because comprehensive national origin data was not available for this year.
-7-In Section I we describe our data. We precisely define each variable and we motivate from past literature or common sense why we are using this variable. The documentation of the sources from which we obtained this variable as well as more details about the variable can be found in the Appendix. Section II tests the null hypothesis that only "fundamentals" determine U.S. direct investments abroad. Section III tests the null hypothesis that only "fundamentals" determine U.S. stockholdings abroad. We conclude in Section IV. It is in this section that we lay out the limitations of our research, and point to further research directions. O'Connell and Seasholes (2001) . This data, by a fortunate coincidence, are also for 1997. 15 We experimented with time zones as an alternative measure of distance. The results, being qualitatively similar, are not reported here. 16 The question on national origin is a question on the long form of the U.S. census. It need not be answered. We do not know the proportion of U.S. residents who answer this question. This, of course, leads to a selection bias. This selection bias works in our favor. A respondent will only answer this question only if he/she feels a sense of belonging to the national origin group; such a person is more likely to invest in his/her country of origin than a person who did not answer this question. We use both numbers as well as total income of immigrants in all our tests because it could be argued that though the number of immigrants from a country living in the United States may be high, their income is low, and so they cannot invest much in their country of origin.
I. Data

A. Dependent Variables
-8- language of the country and 0 otherwise, the race variable is the proportion of whites in the population of the country, the religion variable is the proportion of Christians in the population of the country, and the national origin variable is the number or the total income of immigrants from that country living in the United
States. 16 We further subdivide the immigrant groups into two cohorts, native-born and foreign-born. We do this to check if the relationship is stronger for any cohort group. If national origin breeds investment because of an information reason, we should expect the relationship to be stronger for the foreign-born person, because as she has just come from this country, she is expected to know more about the country than a -9-native-born person. Details of the above five familiarity variables -precise definitions of the variables and the sources from where we obtained these variables -are given in the Appendix.
B2. Control variables proxying for "fundamentals" determining direct investment
There is a vast literature using ad hoc linear cross-country regressions to search for the determinants of foreign direct investments. Chakravarti (2001) percentage in total tax revenues from taxes on income, profit and capital gains, percentage in total tax revenues from import duties, and percentage in total tax revenues from export duties. Direct investments should increase with integration with the rest of the world. We use three measures: exports plus imports divided by GDP, which is defined as openness in Bekaert and Harvey (1995), a capital controls index constructed as in Bartolini and Drazan (1997) , and a liberalization dummy constructed from Bekaert and Harvey (2000) . Direct investments should increase with better infrastructure. We use six measures: air freight, rail freight, roads freight, percentage of paved roads, telephone lines per 1000, and telephone lines per employee. Direct investments should increase with capital market development. We use six measures:
credit to private sector divided by GDP (Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) where we obtained these variables -are given in the Appendix.
B3. Control variables proxying for "fundamentals" determining indirect investment
There is a vast literature on equity home bias that tries to explain why investors hold a disproportionate amount of home-country equity in their stock portfolios. Lewis (1999) and Karolyi and
Stulz (2001) provide comprehensive surveys. We use the measures that have been tried before. Foreign stockholdings should increase with predicted equity holdings. If the world equity portfolio is the market portfolio, then predicted holdings of the U.S. in a country would be the weight of the country's stock market in the total world stock market multiplied by total U.S. stockholdings (Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (2001)). As a matter of fact, the deviations of actual equity holdings from predicted equity holdings is defined as the home bias. The rest of the measures that follow attempt to explain this deviation. First, foreign stockholdings should increase with stock market development. We use five measures: size of stock market divided by GDP, average size of a listed firm, number of listed firms, volume of trade in the stock market, and volume of trade in the stock market divided by size of the stock market. Second, foreign stockholdings should be affected by risk-return tradeoffs. We use three measures: foreign stockholdings should increase with the ratio of mean stock market dollar return to standard deviation of stock market dollar returns (Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (2001)); it should decrease with the correlation of stock market 17 We do not use the liberalization dummy because in 1997, the only year for which we have data, all countries in our sample were liberalized.
-11-return with U.S. stock market return because of less diversification potential; and it should decrease with the standard deviation of the real exchange rate. Third, foreign stockholdings should increase with integration with the rest of the world. We use three measures: exports plus imports divided by GDP, which is defined as openness in Bekaert and Harvey (1995), a capital controls index constructed as in Bartolini and Drazan (1997) , and a foreign ownership restrictions index constructed as in Edison and Warnock (2001) . Though Figure 1 is deceptive because it does not formally test whether the differences are significant, it should be noted that the difference is the greatest for the national origin classification (Panel E). Table 1 addresses this criticism. Figure 1 is also deceptive because it does not test whether the differences, even if significant, remain when we control for other influences. 10 percent or less) in all the three years are race, total income of the national origin group, and total income of the native-born of the national origin group. As the total income of the foreign-born of the national origin group is not statistically significant in any year, we can conclude that the effect is coming from the nativeborn, and not the foreign-born. The signs of the coefficients tell us that, unconditionally, countries with more whites in their population and/or countries with economically stronger native-born emigrant groups in the United States, attract more U.S. foreign direct investments. The income of the native-born national origin group can explain 23%, 18%, and 11% of the variation in U.S. direct investments abroad in the years 1990, 1997, and 2000 respectively.
Of the control variables, the "fundamentals" of a country that statistically significantly (p-values of 10 percent or less) influence U.S. foreign direct investments in all the three years are two measures of economic development (average GDP and average per capita income), one measure of integration with the rest of the world (capital controls index), two measures of infrastructure (air freight and number of telephone lines per 1000 people) and one measure of capital market development (credit to private sector/GDP).
Interestingly, stock market development does not seem to matter. The signs of the coefficients are as expected. Unconditionally, countries which are more economically developed, which are more integrated with the rest of the world, which have better infrastructure, and which have more well-developed credit markets, attract more U.S. foreign direct investments. Table 2 checks whether the income of the native-born national origin group continues to remain significant after we have controlled for the "fundamental" determinants of foreign direct investments. We first reduce the number of control variables by extracting their major principal components. We obtain 7, -14-5 and 5 significant principal components for the years 1990, 1997 and 2000, respectively. Table 2 gives results of multi-variate regressions for 1990, 1997 and 2000, where the dependent variable is U.S. direct investment, and the independent variables are the above extracted major principal components from the control variables and each familiarity variable in turn.
Though we do not report it in Table 2 , the effect of the other familiarity variables -physical distance, language, race and religion -continue to remain insignificant after we have added the controls. The only familiarity variable that statistically significantly influences (p-values of 10% or less) U.S. direct investment in a foreign country in all the three years, 1990, 1997, and 2000 , is the total income of the native-born of the national origin group. The signs of the coefficients tell us that, controlling for the expected influences, countries with economically stronger native-born emigrant groups in the U.S., attract more U.S. foreign direct investments. Interestingly, our high R-squares tell us that the independent variables can explain up to half of the variation in U.S. foreign direct investments.
All our tests till now are cross-sectional. Though we make an attempt to control for every hypothesized "fundamental" determinant that affects foreign direct investments, it is possible that we may miss a few important determinants. These fixed effects may, therefore, explain our results, rather than the income of the native-born of the national origin group. To rectify this problem, we run panel tests that control for fixed effects. Table 3 gives the results from these panel tests. The dependent variable is U.S. direct investment.
The independent variables are the independent variables from Table 1 that turned out to be significant (pvalue less than 10%) in all the three years, 1990, 1997 and 2000. Table 3 shows that the effect of race is insignificant after we control for the significant "fundamental" determinants of foreign direct investments, but the effect of the income of the native-born of the national origin group continues to remain significant. This is powerful evidence that, controlling for the expected influences, countries with economically stronger native-born emigrant groups in the U.S., attract more U.S. foreign direct investments. Though Figure 2 is deceptive because it does not formally test whether the differences are significant, it should be noted that the difference is the greatest for the national origin classification (Panel E). Table 3 addresses this criticism. Figure 2 is also deceptive because it does not test whether the differences, even if significant, remain when we control for other influences. Table 4 deals with this criticism. 2001) .) There is just one independent variable, which could be any of the familiarity or control variables. The only familiarity variables that are statistically significant (p-values of 10 percent or less) for both the two different data sources are total income of the national origin group and total income of the native-born of the national origin group. As the total income of the foreign-born of the national origin group is not statistically significant in any year, we can conclude that the effect is coming from the native-born, and not the foreign-born. The signs of the coefficients tell us that, unconditionally, countries with economically stronger native-born emigrant groups in the United States, attract more U.S.
III. Effect of National Origin on U.S. Indirect Investments Abroad
shareholdings.
Of the control variables, the "fundamental" that is really important is predicted equity holdings. This seems to explain 85% of the variation in actual U.S. stockholdings in a foreign country for the regression that uses the government survey, and 78% of the variation in actual U.S. stockholdings in a foreign country for the regression that uses private data. However, it does not explain everything, nor is the coefficient on it equal to one, which implies that there are factors other than the ones hypothesized by the international capital asset pricing model that drives actual U.S. stockholdings. What are these factors? From our tests, the other Table 5 checks whether the income of the native-born national origin group continues to remain significant after we have controlled for the "fundamental" determinants of foreign indirect investments. Of the control variables, we keep the predicted equity holdings because it was so important, but further reduce the number of other control variables by extracting principal components from them. We obtain 5 significant principal components from each of the two independent data sources respectively. Table 5 gives results of multi-variate regressions for the two independent data sources, where the dependent variable is U.S. indirect investment, and the independent variables are the predicted equity holding variable, the above extracted major principal components from the other control variables, and each familiarity variable in turn.
Though we do not report it in Table 5 , the effect of the other familiarity variables -physical distance, race, religion, and language -continue to remain insignificant after we have added the controls. The only familiarity variable that statistically significantly influences (p-values of 10% or less) U.S. stockholdings in a foreign country in both the two independent data sources is the total income of the native-born of the national origin group. The signs of the coefficients tell us that, controlling for the expected influences, countries with economically stronger native-born emigrant groups, attract more U.S. shareholdings.
Interestingly, our high R-squares tell us that the independent variables can explain up more than threequarters of the variation in U.S. foreign shareholdings. Much of this high explanatory power comes from the predicted equity holdings variable, telling us that the significant determinant of U.S. stockholdings in a foreign country is the size of that country's stock market.
IV. Concluding Remarks
We made an attempt in this paper to explore an old question in the social sciences -how fast do immigrants shed the identity acquired in their country of origin and assume the new identity of their country of residence -using finance data. The idea is to ask whether, when it comes to directly investing or indirectly investing in a particular foreign country, immigrants in the United States consider only the "fundamentals" of the country under consideration -the melting pot hypothesis -or, besides the "fundamentals," they also care whether this particular foreign country is their country of origin -the salad bowl hypothesis. If national origin affects direct investments abroad, it should affect indirect investments abroad in the same direction as well.
This is what we find. After controlling for the "fundamentals" hypothesized in the literature, we document that U.S. investments in a foreign country are positively affected by the income of the immigrant group from that country living in the United States. This national origin bias exists for both direct as well as indirect investments (foreign stock holdings). The other economic geography variables of that country -physical distance, race, language and religion -do not seem to affect U.S investments in that country. We interpret this to mean that the U.S. is a salad bowl and not a melting pot when it comes to investing abroad.
Our study has a number of limitations, which we hope future researchers with better data sets will 
B15. National Origin
B151. Total is defined as the total number of members of a certain national origin group.
B152
. Total X Income is defined as the total number of members of a certain national origin group multiplied by the per capita income of this group.
B153. Native -Born cohort is defined as the total number of members of a certain national origin group that were born in the USA.
B154. Native-Born X Income is defined as the total number of members of a certain national origin group that were born in USA multiplied by the per capita income of this group.
B155. Foreign -Born cohort is defined as the total number of members of a certain national origin group that were not born in the USA.
B156. Foreign-Born X Income is defined as the total number of members of a certain national origin group that were not born in USA multiplied by the per capita income of this group.
For 1990, B151 through B156 are estimated by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Source: The 1990
Census of Population and Housing (1993) . However, for 1997 and 2000, we estimated these from the Current Population Surveys (CPS) conducted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. This is our estimation algorithm for the CPS data. We assign a respondent to a national origin group, if he or she declared himself/herself as the member of the national origin group, or if both the parents belonged to the same national origin group, or one of the parents belonged to the national group and the other parent belonged to the USA. The per capita income was taken to be the mid-point of the range provided by the household divided by the number of members in the household. Source: Current Population Survey (http://www.bls.
census.gov/cps/). Restrictions, 1989 Restrictions, , 1990 Restrictions, , 1996 Restrictions, , 1997 Restrictions, , 1999 .
B2. Control variables proxying for "fundamentals" determining direct investment
B243. Liberalization dummy equals 1 at time t (t= 1990, 1997, 2000) if the official liberalization date of this country is at or before t. Source: Bekaert and Harvey (2000). B283. Corruption index is measured in units ranging from about -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance outcome (i.e, higher value means less corruption). This variable is used only for 1997 estimations, because the survey from which the index is obtained covers that year but not others. Source:
Worldwide Governance Research Indicators that is available from http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/ governance/datasets.htm#dataset.
B3. Control variables proxying for "fundamentals" determining indirect investment (foreign stockholdings)
B31. Predicted equity holdings are defined as U.S. holdings in country i if the world equity portfolio was the market portfolio. In this case, predicted equity holdings of a U.S. investor would be the weight of stock market capitalization of country i in the total world stock market capitalization multiplied by total U.S. equity holdings. Total U.S. equity holdings are calculated as the sum of foreign equity holdings and domestic equity holdings held by U.S. citizens. Domestic equity holdings of U.S. citizens is U.S. stock market capitalization minus the U.S. equities owned by foreigners. Sources for the stock market capitalization of various countries: IFC, The Emerging Stock Markets Factbook (2000) and http://www.fibv.com. Source for equity holdings of U.S. investors abroad (these could be obtained only for 1997) was http://www.treas.gov/fpis/flts.html, and source for equity holdings of foreigners in U.S. was http://www.treas.gov/fis/.
B32. Stock market development
B321. Market cap of stock market/GDP is the same as B263 for 1997.
B322
. Average market cap of listed firm is the same as B264 for 1997.
B323. Number of listed firms is defined as the total number of listed firms in country i in 1997. Source:
World Bank, http://sima-ext.worldbank.org/query/.
B324. Volume of trade is the same as B265 for 1997.
B325. Volume of trade /Market cap of stock market is the same as B266 for 1997.
B33. Risk -Return
B331. Mean stock market return / Standard dev. of return is estimated as the ratio of average monthly dollar dividend-adjusted return of stock market index of country i and its standard deviation for the January, 1994
to December 1997 period. The minimum required number of months with data for each market is 12. Notes: The dependent variable is U.S. level of direct investments in a foreign country. Description and sources of all variables are given in Section I and in the Appendix of the paper. * Significance at the 10-percent level. ** Significance at the 5-percent level. *** Significance at the 1-percent level. Notes: The dependent variable is U.S. level of direct investments in a foreign country. The independent variables are obtained as follows. In the first step, we reduce the number of control variables in Table 1 by extracting major principal components from all the control variables. In the second step, we run a multi-variate OLS regression using the extracted principal components and one familiarity variable (Native-Born X Income) as the independent variable. Though we do not report in the above table, we also ran this multi-variate OLS regression using the other familiarity variables. The results from those regressions are: in the 2000 regression, distance was significant at 8%, while language, race, religion are not; in the 1997 regression, distance, race, religion and language are not significant; and in the 1990 regression, distance, race, religion and language are not significant. * Significance at the 10-percent level. * * Significance at the 5-percent level. *** Significance at the 1-percent level. 
Notes:
The dependent variable is U.S. level of direct investments in a foreign country. The independent variables are the fixed effect dummies of the three years and the independent variables from Table 1 that were found to be statistically significant in all three years. Coefficients and p-values are estimated with a bootstrap method with re-sampling. Number of repetition was 10000. * Significance at the 10-percent level. * * Significance at the 5-percent level. *** Significance at the 1-percent level. Notes: The dependent variable is U.S. level of stockholdings in a foreign country. These come from two sources. Description and sources of all variables are given in Section I and in the Appendix of the paper. * Significance at the 10-percent level. ** Significance at the 5-percent level. *** Significance at the 1-percent level. 
The dependent variable is U.S. level of stockholdings in a foreign country. These comer from two sources. The independent variables are obtained as follows. In the first step, we reduce the number of control variables in Table 4 by extracting major principal components from all the control variables. In the second step, we run a multi-variate OLS regression using the extracted principal components and one familiarity variable (Native-Born X Income) as the independent variable. Though we do not report in the above table, we also ran this multi-variate OLS regression using the other familiarity variables. The results from those regressions are: in the Froot et al (1997) regression, distance was significant at 5.3%, while language, race, religion are not; in the other regression, distance, race, religion and language are not significant. * Significance at the 10-percent level. * * Significance at the 5-percent level. *** Significance at the 1-percent level. 
